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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY IN
CRIMINAL CASES
BY C. ZACHARY SELTZER*
The recognition of a defendant's right to pre-trial inspection of grand
jury testimony is of recent origin. At common law, a defendant had no right
to learn what went on before the grand jury, or to see a record of the evidence
produced against him before that body. The penalties for disclosure by a
member of the grand inquest to the accused of the evidence produced against
him were severe. If the crime for which the defendant had been indicted were
a felony, the grand juror who violated his oath of secrecy could be held as an
accessory. If the offense were treason, the juror could be held as.a principal.
Later such conduct was denounced as a high misprision.' This harshness
was in keeping with the general reluctance of the common law to afford the
prisoner any discovery in a criminal case. He had no right to a copy of the
indictment, and it was only because of statutory mandate, in cases of treason,
2
that he was served with a copy of the indictment and a list of witnesses.
The rigor of the common law was mitigated in the nineteenth century in
England by various acts of Parliament. The most important of these, The Indictable Offenses Act, 3 provided for the preliminary examination of the accused
before a committing magistrate, and gave the accused the right to obtain copies
of the depositions of the prosecution witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoner had been committed for trial. This enabled the defendant to obtain full
discovery of the testimonial evidence in the hands of the prosecutor prior to the
trial of the indictment, and at the same time limited the Crown to the proofs
adduced at the preliminary hearing. In time, the magistrate's hearing and
depositions rendered the grand jury obsolete, and in 1933 the grand jury was
4
abolished in England.
* B.S.C., 1928, Drexel Institute; LL.B., 1932, Rutgers University (South Jersey)
LL.C.M., 1960, University of Pennsylvania; member, New Jersey Bar; author, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW JERSEY LAW.

1. See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Comment, The
Impact of Jencks v. United States and Subsequent Legislation on the Secrecy of -Grand
Jury Minutes, 27 FORD. L. REV. 244 (1958).
2.

See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1859g (3d ed. 1940) ; The King v. Holland, 4 T.R.

691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792) ; Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E.
809 (1911) ; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
3. 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, §§ 1, 27.
4. The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1.
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In this country, the right to indictment by grand jury has been preserved
by our federal constitution," and by law in many states." In federal prosecutions, the accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense. 7 Also, Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective in 1946,8 modified the federal practice and permitted a
disclosure of grand jury testimony by court order preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding, or on a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
In the states, the common law rule that restricted the defendant's right
to pre-trial discovery was dominant. 9 Where the indictment was so general
that it did not convey sufficient information to enable defendant to prepare
his defense, the court, on motion and in its discretion, could order the prosecutor to furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars of the allegations of
the indictment. 10 Except for the movement in the western states to circumvent the grand jury indictment by an information and preliminary hearing,
there was little to change the common law rule of restrictive discovery." In
several states,' 2 statutes were adopted which gave the defendant a right to a
copy of the stenographic record of the testimony heard before the grand jury,
3
but this was an innovation.'
It was not until the United States Supreme Court decision in Jencks v.
United States' 4 that pre-trial discovery in criminal cases was given serious
consideration.' 5 In the Jencks case, the Government's principal witnesses
were Matusow and Ford, Communist Party members who had been paid by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make reports of party activities in
which they had participated. Jencks had been convicted in the trial court and,
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. REV.
290 (1959).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. See Norris v. United States, 190 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1951).
9. Note, Pretrial Inspection of Prosecution's Evidence by Defendant, 53 DICK. L.
REV. 301 (1949).
10. See, e.g., People v. Westrup, 372 Ill. 517, 25 N.E.2d 16 (1939) ; People v. Gerold,
265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914) ; State v. Pennsylvania R.R., 84 N.J.L. 550, 87 Atl.
86 (Sup. Ct. 1913) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-143 (1953).
11. See Comment, The Propriety of the Grand Jury Report, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 746
(1956); Watts, supra note 6; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
12. See Ky. REV. STAT. tit. 6, ch. 1, § 110 (App. 1959) (to be superseded by Ky. R..
CRIer. P. 5.16, effective Jan. 1, 1963) ; IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 772.4 (1950) ; CAL.
PEN. CODE §§ 925, 938.1 (1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.04 (1947) ; Turk v. Martin,
323 Ky. 479, 23 S.W.2d 937 (1930).
13. See Kinder v. Kentucky, 279 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
14. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
15. Comment, supra note 1.
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on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the
trial court had refused to direct the Government to produce the prior reports
by Matusow and Ford for use in their cross-examination. The Court held
that a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the contents of the
report and the testimony of the witnesses was not required to obtain the order
for the Government to produce the FBI report. This language was soon construed to mean that a defendant could have a copy of the grand jury testimony
of a government witness, at the trial, without a previous examination by the
trial court for inconsistency in testimony. 16 As a result, Congress passed an
act, commonly known as the "Jencks statute,' 7 which modified the Jencks
rule and limited its application to statements made to government agents. I8
The Jencks case was not to apply to grand jury minutes.' 9
Under the statute, the statement of a witness to a government agent cannot be produced until the witness has testified on direct examination. If the
United States claims that the statement contains matter which does not relate
to the subject matter of the testimony, the court may order the Government to
produce the statement to the court for inspection in chambers. The court then
determines what portions of the statement may be used on cross-examination.
Thus the Jencks statute contemplates an in camera screening of the witness'
statement in the event of an objection by the Government. 2 The same procedure is followed, in effect, with respect to grand jury testimony to be used to
impeach or contradict a witness for the Government, except that the latter is
regulated by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.21
It is in the realm of state court decisions that the Jencks case has had its
greatest influence. Although not binding upon the state courts, because it did
not involve a constitutional question and was concerned with federal procedure, the case nonetheless has been accorded great weight.2 2 It has been frequently cited as authority for the more liberal approach to the problem of
pre-trial discovery, not only as to grand jury testimony, but also with respect
to statements of prosecuting witnesses, as well as the inspection of confessions,
documents, records and tangible physical objects.
16. United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
18. See Comment, Right of the Defendant to Inspect Statements of Witnesses in
the Hands of the Prosecution,1961 U. ILL. L.F. 187 (1961).
19. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
20. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). If the Government does not
object and claim that the statement contains unrelated matter, the defendant is entitled
to have the complete statement. See People v. Wolff, 19 Ill.
2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197
(1960).
21. See note 19 supra.
22. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958) ; People v. Wolff,
supra note 20.
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TRADITIONAL SECRECY OF GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

As shown above, the Jencks case and statute deal with the right to inspect
the statements of witnesses for the purposes of impeachment at the trial, under
the supervision of the court, and Rule 6(e) permits a similar right as to
grand jury testimony. If this can be done at the trial, why should the defendant not have this right in advance of trial, so that he can prepare in advance his cross-examination and other aspects of his defense? The principal
obstacle is the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
Grand juries exist in all the states, although indictment by grand jury is
essential only for serious crimes in about half the states. In the latter, waiver
of indictment is often allowed, except in capital cases. 23 Alaska and Hawaii,
24
the two newly admitted states, also provide for indictment by grand jury.
In at least two states, Kansas 25 and Wyoming, 26 grand juries are seldom
convened. Criminal prosecution by information, instead of by grand jury
indictment, is the usual procedure in many of the western states.27 The information usually follows the preliminary hearing before a magistrate after
the defendant has been committed for trial. 28 This preliminary hearing, like
all preliminary hearings before magistrates in this country, is merely for the
purpose of establishing a prima facie case or "probable cause" of guilt, and
is not intended to disclose any more of the evidence in the hands of the prosecutor than is necessary to hold the defendant for further proceedings. There
has been no attempt made in this country to adopt the English system, and
to make the preliminary hearing the all-inclusive discovery device that permits a defendant and his counsel to learn the nature and extent of the evidence
against him.

29

In those jurisdictions where the information is used more frequently
than an indictment by grand jury, it would seem that there is less reason for
secrecy than in those jurisdictions where grand jury indictment is the usual
course. Nevertheless, all jurisdictions, either by statute, common law, or rule
23. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1169; Watts, supra note 6; Younger, The Grand
Jury Under Attack, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 26 (1955) ; Comment, supra note 11,
at 747.
24. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. tit. 66, § 8-2 (Supp. 1958), § 8-51 (1949) ; REV.
LAWS HAWAII §§ 258-3, 279-1 (1955).
25. In Kansas, a grand jury can be summoned only by petition signed by taxpayers
and addressed to the court. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62-901 (1949) ; Ex parte Frye, 173 Kan.
392, 246 P.2d 313 (1952). Prosecution may be by indictment or information. KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 62-801 (1949).
26. In Wyoming, a grand jury must be ordered by the district court. WYo. STAT.
tit. 7, § 92 (1959). Prosecution may be by indictment or information. Wvo. STAT. tit. 7,
§ 118 (1959).
27. See authorities cited note 23 supra. For a history of the attempt to abolish
grand juries in this country see Watts, supra note 6, and Younger, supra note 23.
28. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1183.
29. Ibid.
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of court, have preserved in one way or another the rule of secrecy of grand
jury proceedings.30 The principal reasons for the rule are summarized in the
.case of United States v. Rose,3 1 as follows: (1) to prevent the escape of those
whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to
the grand jury in its deliberations and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before
the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect an innocent accused
who is exonerated, from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there is no probability of guilt.
But the rule of secrecy has not been considered an absolute mandate in
this country. By statute in some states, grand jury testimony is permitted at
the trial of an indictment for perjury, to impeach a witness, and on order of
the court where the disclosure would promote justice.3 2 The rule of secrecy
has been held in some jurisdictions not to apply to witnesses who testified
before the grand jury. Their testimony given before the grand jury would
not be privileged from disclosure, and inconsistent statements made to the
33
grand jury are admissible at the trial to impeach or discredit the witnesses.
The practice sometimes resorted to is to call the clerk of the grand jury to
testify at the trial to what the witness said before the grand jury, in order to
34
contradict the witness' testimony at the trial.
A tactic often employed by counsel for the defendant to determine whether
there is an inconsistency in a witness' testimony with that given before the
grand jury is to ask the witness whether he testified before the grand jury
85
and whether his testimony at the trial is contradictory thereof.
The fear of violation of secrecy is no longer a valid reason for denying
the examination of the transcript of the testimony when the indictment is
returned and the accused is in custody. The accused cannot flee, and the
grand jury is no longer susceptible to outside pressure. As to the possibility
30. See list of jurisdictions in Note, 46

VA.

L.

REV.

1002, 1003 (1960).

31. 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954).
32. See Note, supra note 30, at 1004; see also MIcH. STAT. ANN. ch. 287, § 28.959
(1954) ; IND. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 9-817 (1956).
33. In re Hearings Before the Committee, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1956)
State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; State v. Goldman, 14
N.J. Misc. 463, 185 Atl. 505 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
34. See, e.g., People v. Goldberg, 302 Ill. 559, 135 N.E. 84 (1922) ; State v. Archibald, 204 Iowa 406, 215 N.W. 258 (1927) ; State v. Bovino, 89 N.J.L. 586, 99 Atl. 313
(Ct. Err. & App. 1916) ; State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950).
35. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361 (1956) ; State v. Graziani,
60 N.J. Super. 1, 158 A.2d 375 (App. Div. 1959).
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that the accused may resort to perjured rebuttal testimony, the answer usually
given is that the defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence until
the contrary is established.86 These seem to be the rationales behind the
statutes and cases which permit pre-trial inspection of grand jury testimony.
RIGHT TO GRAND JURY TESTIMONY BY STATUTE

Several state statutes require the state to furnish the defendant with a
copy of grand jury testimony prior to trial. In California, when an indictment
is found against a defendant, the reporter certifies and files with the county
clerk an original transcript, and as many copies as there are defendants, of
his shorthand notes of the testimony given before the grand jury. The reporter must complete such certification and filing within ten days after the
indictment is found, unless the time is extended by court order. The county
clerk delivers the original transcript to the district attorney immediately upon
receipt and transmits a copy thereof to each of the defendants or his attorney.3 7
In Kentucky, any person indicted by the grand jury has the right to
procure a copy of the stenographic record of the testimony heard before the
grand jury by paying the prescribed fee for such report,3 8 notwithstanding
that under the Kentucky Criminal Code every grand juror is required to keep
secret whatever he or any other grand juror may have said, or in what manner
he, or any other grand juror, may have voted on matters before them.3 9 It is
recognized by the Kentucky cases that the grand jury transcript may be of
assistance to defense counsel in the preparation of his case, and that it may
40
also be used in contradicting witnesses at the trial.
By Iowa statute, 41 a defendant has a right to disclosure of the grand jury
minutes after the indictment is returned. 42 The clerk of the court must, within
two days after demand made, furnish the defendant or his counsel with a copy
of the minutes of evidence before the grand jury, without charge, or permit
the defendant's counsel to take a copy.
Minnesota requires that a copy of the testimony of each witness examined
before the grand jury be filed with the clerk of the court. After the arrest of
the defendant, the clerk, within two days after demand by the defendant, and
36. See Note, supra note 30, at 1006.
37. CAL. PEN. CODE tit. 4, §§ 925, 938.1 (1959) ; People v. Cowen, 41 Cal. App. 2d
824, 107 P.2d 659 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940). The transcript of testimony is not required to
contain a copy of the exhibits introduced before the grand jury. Stern v. Superior
Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 9, 177 P.2d 308 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
38. Ky. REV. STAT. tit. 6, ch. 1, § 110 (App. 1959) (to be superseded by Ky. R.
CRIM. P. 5.16, effective Jan. 1, 1963); Turk v. Martin, supra note 12.
39. Ky. REV. STAT. tit. 6, ch. 1, § 112 (App. 1959) (to be superseded by Ky. R.
CRIM. P. 5.24, effective Jan. 1, 1963); Turk v. Martin, supra note 12.
40. Chinn v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
41. Iowa CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 772.4 (1950).
42. See Comment, 44 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1959).
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upon payment of his fees, must furnish a copy of the testimony so filed to the
defendant or his counsel.

43

Florida gives the accused in a prosecution for perjury or subornation of
perjury allegedly committed before the grand jury, the right in advance of
trial to inspect the transcript of testimony of the witnesses upon whose evidence the charge is based, in order to prepare his defense. 44 The Georgia Constitution 45 gives a defendant the right upon demand to have, together with a
copy of the accusation, a list of the witnesses whose testimony gave rise to
the charge.

46

In New York, under the criminal code, 47 the court in its discretion may
permit an inspection of grand jury minutes by an indicted defendant for the
48
purpose of making a motion to dismiss the indictment.
RIGHT TO GRAND JURY TESTIMONY BY COURT DECISIONS

In the absence of a statute or rule of court expressly permitting an examination of grand jury testimony, the allowance of such inspection, either
before or during the trial, is a matter resting within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and is granted only upon good cause shown. This seems to be
the rule in both federal and state courts.
In the federal courts, the right is governed by Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the Jencks case, as modified by statute,
does not apply to grand jury minutes in the federal courts. 49 In the state
courts, the right to such inspection before trial, absent a rule or statute, is
always within the discretion of the court; whereas, during the trial, the policy
of the Jencks case and statute has generally influenced the state court procedure and has often been applied as well to grand jury minutes. 50
43.
44.

MINN. STAT. ANN. pt. 5,
FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45,

§ 628.04 (1947).
§ 905.27 (1951) ; Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla.

1959) ; Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958).
45.

GA. CONsT. art. 1, para. 5.

46. Knowlton, CriminalLaw and Procedure,9
47.

RUTGERS

L. REV. 108 (1954-55).

N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. tit. 14, § 952-t (1958).

48. People v. Logan, 206 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1959); People v. Pankow, 17
Misc. 2d 143, 186 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Erie County Ct. 1959) ; People v. Teetsel, 12 Misc. 2d
835, 177 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Ulster County Ct. 1958). The opinion in People ex rel. Lemon
v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927), which was written by Cardoza, C.J.,
has often been quoted as authority for limiting the right to pre-trial discovery in criminal
cases. In that case, the defendant had inspected the minutes of the grand jury pursuant
to court order, but an order prohibiting the enforcement of a second order permitting
further examination of statements and autopsies in the hands of the district attorney was
affirmed.
49. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra note 19; United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
50. Authorities cited notes I and 22 supra; see, e.g., State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219,
176 A.2d 1 (1961) ; State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957).
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In the Federal Courts
Under Rule 6(e), disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury,
other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror, may be made to the
attorneys for the Government for use in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters
occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminary
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding, or when permitted by the
court, at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist
for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before
the grand jury. The rule also provides that no obligation of secrecy may be
imposed upon any person except in accordance with the rule. The rule has
been construed as vesting discretionary power in the federal courts to grant
an inspection of grand jury testimony. 51
The use of grand jury minutes in support of a motion to dismiss the indictment is not generally favored by the federal courts because of their desire
to preserve the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings.52 An application for examination of such minutes must be made by properly verified
pleadings showing that proper grounds exist for the motion to dismiss because
53
of matters occurring before the grand jury.
Disclosure of grand jury minutes has been held proper when the ends
of justice require it. 54 For example, the federal courts have on several occasions granted a defendant, charged with perjury before the grand jury, permission to examine and make a copy of his testimony before that body. 55
Inspection of testimony of witnesses for the Government has not been so
readily granted. Most of the cases dealing with such testimony hold that, until
the trial, the defendant may not call for the grand jury minutes of a witness
for the purpose of impeachment or contradiction, and then the trial court must
examine the minutes in camera to determine whether there is any inconsistency. 56 In United States v. McKeever,57 the court, following United

States v. Zborowski5 5 declared the procedure in the Second Circuit to be
that after a government witness has testified on direct examination, if there
appears to be some basis for supposing that his grand jury testimony may
51. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra note 19.
52. United States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), United
Sugarman, 139 F. Supp. 878 (D.R.I. 1956).
53. Ibid.
54. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra note 19; Costello
States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Byoir, 147 F.2d 336
1945).
55. United States v. Rose, supra note 31; United States v. Remington,
246 (2d Cir. 1951) ; United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952).
56. United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959).
57. 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959).
58. Su pra note 56.

States v.
v. United
(5th Cir.
191 F.2d
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be at variance with his trial testimony, the defense may ask the trial judge to
examine the witness' grand jury testimony. If the trial judge finds any
material discrepancy between the trial testimony and the grand jury testimony,
the relevant part of the minutes is made available to the defendant."19
The court in the McKeever case, referring to the obligation of the United
States Attorney in cases where the defendant seeks to use grand jury minutes
to contradict or impeach a witness, suggested that the Government should be
prepared to advise the trial judge regarding possible discrepancies between
the trial and grand jury testimony, and that it is the duty of the prosecutor
to consent to make such testimony available when there is a reasonable basis
for believing that the testimony differs on matters which are not immaterial. 0
Later cases in other circuits have indicated that, to be effective, the re61
quest must be made for the trial court to examine the testimony in camera
and that defendant must show that a "particularized need" exists for the
minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy of the grand jury.6 2 However,
where the trial judge in camera examines the minutes and finds no inconsistency with the testimony of the witness at the trial, he properly may refuse
to permit defense counsel to inspect the testimony.6 3 It is not necessary that
defendant show a possible inconsistency before the trial court may honor his
request that the court inspect the testimony, 4 but the trial judge, in exercising
his discretion, would nevertheless be bound to consider evidence suggesting
the possibility of such inconsistencies.6
How the "particularized need" or suggested inconsistency is to be shown
is not pointed out by the decisions.66 Perhaps the practice recommended in
the New Jersey case of State v. Graziani6 7 may be followed, since witnesses
before the grand jury in many jurisdictions are not bound by the oath of
secrecy taken by the grand jurors themselves, and defense counsel at the trial
may inquire of the witnesses whether they appeared before the grand jury
and whether their testimony at the trial is contradictory with that given before
the grand jury. 68 However, the admissibility of grand jury minutes. in state
courts, as distinguished from the federal courts, in the last few years has been
marked by a more liberal development.
59. See also United States v. Hernandez, 282 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960) ; United States
v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958).
60. United States v. McKeever, supra note 57, at 672 n.2.
61. United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1960).
62. Ibid.; Berry v. United States, 295 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Bary v. United
States, 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961).
63. United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961).
64. United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961).
65. De Binder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
66. See State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960).
67. Supra note 35.
68. See Costello v. United States, supra note 35; Comment, 27 FORD. L. REV. 244,
252 (1958). In the federal courts, the secrecy rule does not apply as to witnesses who
appeared before the grand jury. In re Hearings Before the Committee, supra note 33.
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In the State Courts
At the Trial
In some jurisdictions it has been held that at the trial of a criminal indictment a defendant is entitled to inspect the grand jury testimony of the
state's witnesses where the prosecutor, in examining the witnesses at the
trial, uses the transcript of their grand jury testimony as a basis for direct
examination. This right to inspect such testimony is asserted for the purpose
of determining whether there is impeaching or contradictory evidence to be
offered to the jury.6 9
The practice followed in New York is that if the district attorney uses
the grand jury minutes during the trial, the defendant will be permitted to
inspect them, the extent of the examination being determined by the court
according to the circumstances of each case. The defendant is allowed to
70
examine only the testimony of the witnesses he wishes to cross-examine.
Where the district attorney does not use the minutes at trial, it would also
seem that the defendant may request the grand jury testimony, but the trial
court must find that it contains material at variance with the testimony given
by the particular witness on the stand before the minutes can be made available to defense counsel for cross-examination. 7 1 Pre-trial inspection of grand
jury testimony has not as yet been accepted as common procedure in New
72
York.
In Florida, the rule of secrecy is balanced by the necessity for disclosure
to meet the ends of justice, and at trial, where there appears to be a need for
the transcript of grand jury testimony, an application may be made to the
court, before cross-examination, for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecurn
directed to the official court reporter to produce the transcript of the witness
for use on cross-examination. But when the testimony is produced by the
court stenographer in answer to such subpoena, the trial court must examine
the minutes to determine their materiality before permitting the defendant to
have access to the transcript. 73 Mandamus has been held to be the proper
69. State v. Morgan, supra note 66; Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957).
70. People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931); People v. Nicoll, 158
N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1956). See State v. Morgan, supra note 66.
71. See People v. Dales, 309 N.Y. 97, 127 N.E.2d 829 (1955).
72. People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881 (1961) ; People v. Walsh, 262
N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933) ; People v. Giles, 31 Misc. 2d 354, 220 N.Y.S.2d 905
(Erie County Ct. 1961). Where the defendant is indicted for perjury before the grand
jury, the court in a proper case may order the district attorney to furnish him with a
copy of relevant portions of his testimony before that body. People v. Calandrillo, 29
Misc. 2d 495, 215 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Suffolk County Ct. 1961) ; see People v. Kresel, 142
Misc. 88, 254 N.Y.S. 193 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
73. Trafficante v. State, supra note 69; see FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 905.27 (Supp.
1961).
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remedy against the court that refuses to permit the production of the grand
74
jury transcript pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.
In Illinois, it has been held that the accused has no right to be furnished
with minutes of testimony given before the grand jury.75 However, at the
trial, if the prosecutor uses any portion of such testimony in his examination,
the accused is entitled to access to such portions of the transcript so em76
ployed, but he is not entitled to see the entire record.
Before Trial
Within the last few years there seems to have occurred a change in the
concept of the right to examine grand jury testimony before the trial. In
recent decisions in Missouri, 77 Utah 78 and New Jersey, 79 an unmistakable
trend in the direction of a more liberal pre-trial discovery and inspection of
such testimony has become apparent. All of these cases base the right on good
cause shown to promote the ends of justice, and all of them make clear that
the right rests within the discretion of the trial court.
Under the Missouri statutes, 80 proceedings before the grand jury are
required to be kept secret. However, there is a provision8 l that members of
the grand jury may be required by any court to testify as to whether the
testimony of a witness examined before such jury is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before the court, and they may also be required
to disclose the testimony given before them by any person upon a complaint
against such person for perjury, or upon his trial for such offense. But, until
the decision in State ex rel. Clagett v. James,8 2 a defendant had no right to
pre-trial inspection of grand jury testimony.8 3 He could impeach a witness
only by calling a member of the grand inquest to testify to what the witness
had said at the session. In the discretion of the court, he might have the inspection for some special reason as where he sought to move against the
indictment.8 4 The Clagett decision changed this and permitted pre-trial examination of the grand jury testimony of witnesses for the state.
In the Clagett case, an indictment had been returned charging a de74. State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936).
75. Cannon v. People, 141 Ill. 270, 30 N.E. 1027 (1892).
76. People v. Moretti, 6 Ill. 2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709 (1955) ; see Grady, Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 827 (1959).
77. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959).
78. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959).
79. State v. Moffa, supra note 50.
80. Mo. REV. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 540.310-.320 (1959).

81. Mo.

REv. STAT.

tit. 37, § 540.300 (1959).

82. Supra note 77.
83. State v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 119 S.W.2d 286 (1938). The Missouri statute
also allows the accused to take depositions including the depositions of parties appearing
before the grand jury. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
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fendant with soliciting a bribe and committing perjury. The names of the
witnesses were endorsed on the indictment as required by statute. Defendant
obtained an order of the trial court permitting an inspection of the minutes
of the grand jury insofar as they related to the testimony of the named witnesses, the defendant and all proceedings which transpired during the course
of their presence before the session. Defendant alleged in his application that
he had reason to believe that unauthorized persons were permitted to be
present in the grand jury room, that the evidence before the grand jury was
insufficient, and that he required the testimony for a motion to dismiss the
indictment. Clagett, the special prosecuting attorney, brought a writ of prohibition against Judge James of the circuit court to prevent the enforcement
of the order permitting the inspection. The Missouri Supreme Court held
that the respondent had jurisdiction to make orders for inspection of the
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses and defendant, or such parts
thereof as he deemed proper to meet the ends of justice, but that the orders
were too broad in authorizing inspection as to "all proceedings which transpired during the course of their presence [defendant and the witnesses] in
the grand jury room, or in connection with their testimony before the grand
jury." On rehearing, s5 the court, two judges dissenting, reaffirmed the power
of the trial court to exercise its discretion and held that inspection should be
limited to testimony of only those witnesses who testify at trial and to such
parts of the transcript of their testimony as would be admissible in evidence
and would be necessary to meet the ends of justice under all the circumstances
shown. The court agreed with the relator that the matter should be regulated
by rule of court, and announced that it was adopting a rule8 6 to provide guides
and standards in the granting of such inspection. The court closed with a
note of warning that the inspection of a grand jury transcript was not to be
permitted for purposes of discovery or as a substitute for taking depositions
of witnesses endorsed on an indictment (as provided by Missouri law), but
87
only to the extent necessary to meet the ends of justice.
85. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, supra note 77, at 289.
86. Mo. R. CRIM. P. 24.24 (effective May 1, 1960). This rule assures the secrecy
of grand jury proceedings, provides that a transcript of testimony of witnesses may be
made available to the prosecuting attorneys, and otherwise, that disclosure may be made
only when directed by the court upon a finding of necessity to meet the ends of justice,
preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding either civil or criminal or when
permitted by the court upon a particularized showing by defendant that grounds may

exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the
grand jury; further, that disclosure shall not be permitted by inspection of transcripts
of testimony for purposes of discovery or as a substitute for taking depositions of witnesses endorsed on an indictment, and no inspection of clerks' minutes shall be permitted;
further, that if inspection of a transcript, or any part thereof, is permitted, it shall not
include disclosure of deliberations, and shall not include disclosure of facts or testimony

that would not be admissible in evidence at the trial.
87. State ex rel. Clagett v. James, supra note 77, at 290.
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In Utah, prior to the decision in State v. Faux,88 the supreme court had
held that a defendant under indictment could not have a pre-trial inspection
of the testimony given by witnesses before the grand jury. 9 Only when at
trial, after the witness had testified, could the defendant have access to such
testimony for impeachment purposes. The Faux decision extended this prior
right to include pre-trial inspection in order that defendant could determine
at the trial whether there was any inconsistency in the testimony.
In the Faux case, the district court had issued an order allowing counsel
for a city commissioner facing trial on an indictment for misconduct in office
to examine the transcript of testimony of witnesses listed on the indictment.
The district attorney sought and obtained from the supreme court an alternative writ prohibiting such inspection. The district attorney contended that,
under the statute, the transcript was available only to him, and that furnishing
it to defense counsel would destroy the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings
and hamper its effectiveness. The contention of the parties centered on two
sections of the Utah statutes, one9" of which provided that the testimony of
witnesses before the grand jury should be taken by a reporter and a transcript
furnished the county clerk and district attorney, and that no person to whom
a transcript was delivered should exhibit the transcript to any person except
upon an order of the court, but that the prosecutor could use the transcript to
impeach the testimony of a witness at a criminal trial or a person being tried
for perjury. The other section 9' provided that no member of the grand jury,
or person present at any session thereof, shall disclose what he or any other
grand juror or person may have said at such session, except that such person
may be required by the court to disclose the testimony of a witness for the
purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness
before the court or to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by
any person charged with perjury. The trial court permitted the pre-trial examination, but required the screening of the testimony by the district attorney
in the presence of counsel for the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Utah recalled the writ of prohibition and held that the defendant was entitled to examine the transcript before trial, but that the "screening" of the
transcript of testimony would have to be done by the trial court and not by
the district attorney.
In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Crockett, the Utah Supreme
Court reasoned that since the language of the statute 92 made it clear that the
88. Supra note 78. See Note, supra note 30, at 1005-06; Note, 39
(1960).
89.
90.
91.

92.

State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950).
§ 77-19-9 (1953).
§ 77-19-10 (1953).

UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 77,
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 77,
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 77,

§§ 77-19-9,-10 (1953).

ORE.

L. REv. 298
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provision for secrecy is qualified by the exception that the testimony given by
witnesses before the grand jury may be disclosed for the purpose of impeaching such witnesses in the event of trial,9 3 it would be cumbersome and difficult
for counsel for the defendant to be compelled to wait until each witness had
testified upon direct examination, before being permitted to procure the
transcript and thereafter to determine whether impeachment of the witness
should be pursued. It was also his view that the defense cannot know whether
the prior testimony of the witness was inconsistent with the testimony given
at the trial unless it knows what the testimony before the grand jury contained. 4 For these reasons it was held that pre-trial examination of the testimony should be permitted.
The court in the Faux case recognized the necessity for secrecy, but
pointed out that once an indictment is found, the statute95 requires that the
names of witnesses who testified before the grand jury in the case be listed
upon the indictment, and thereafter the subject matter of the indictment and
the identity of the witnesses can no longer be secret. However, the court did
state that the right to pre-trial discovery is a matter resting within the discretion of the trial judge because he is close to the litigation and aware of the
exigencies of the case.
Two justices dissented. Justice Callister, upholding the principle of
secrecy, quoted Justice Parker of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Borg,9 6 who held that the obligation of maintaining the secrecy of the grand
jury was not fully effected when the indictment was found, and if at that
juncture the grand jury proceedings were thrown wide open, the possible
damage to the interests of the public by way of aiding the accused would be
incalculable. 9 7 The majority in State v. Faux, however, were of the opinion
that under the more modern concepts of the administration of criminal law,
the fundamental purpose of a criminal trial is not solely to convict the accused-it is to seek the truth and administer justice; and although secrecy
may be justified at certain stages of the proceedings, ultimately the full truth
should be revealed to the court and jury.98
It can be seen from the decision of Justice Parker in the case of State v.
Borg"9 that the defendant in New Jersey would have no right to a transcript
93. State v. Harries, supra note 89.
94. State v. Faux, supra note 78, at 354, 345 P.2d at 188.
95. UTAH CoDE ANN. tit. 77, § 77-20-3 (1953).
96. 8 N.J. Misc. 349, 150 Atl. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
97. Id. at 352, 150 Atl. at 191.
98. State v. Faux, supra note 78, at 354-55, 345 P.2d at 188-89. In this connection,
the language in People v. Walsh, supra note 72, at 150, 186 N.E. at 425, is apropos:
"When, however, it does appear that there is evidence in the possession or control of the
prosecution favorable to the defendant, a right sense of justice demands that it should
be available, unless there are strong reasons otherwise."
99. Supra, note 96.
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of the testimony of witnesses before the grand inquest. State v. Moffa' 00 modified this former rule.
In the Moffa case, the defendant was indicted for subornation of false
swearing. The indictment charged that defendant had persuaded one Blevins
to swear falsely in his testimony before the grand jury. Although there is no
statute or rule in New Jersey requiring the names of witnesses to be endorsed
on the indictment, the indictment against the defendant mentioned Blevins as
the witness and recited that part of his testimony which the indictment alleged
constituted the false swearing of the subornation charged.' 0'
Counsel for the defendant, in advance of trial, made a motion for leave
to inspect the grand jury minutes of the state's chief witness, Blevins, and for
leave to inspect his statements made to the prosecutor. The ground for the
motion was that the testimony was necessary to the defendant to "prepare his
defense," to determine whether or not the witness made any inconsistent statements, to provide the defendant with a basis for cross-examination at the trial,
and to "provide defendant an equal opportunity for a full and fair presentation of the available evidence which is now unilaterally available to the
State."'

02

The trial court granted the motion to inspect the testimony of Blevins in
advance of trial, but denied the motion to inspect his written statements given
to the prosecutor.1 0 3 In granting the pre-trial inspection of the transcript of
the testimony, the trial court held that it was within the discretion of the
court, particularly under the federal decisions, to grant an inspection of the
minutes, and that since Blevins was the principal witness and the state was
obliged to produce him at the trial or its case would fail, the defendant was
10 4
entitled to an opportunity to inspect the testimony.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court, by a four-to-two decision,
affirmed the court below.' 0 5 Chief Justice Weintraub, speaking for the majority, held that since the state, to maintain its case against the defendant, would
have to prove not only that he asked Blevins to swear falsely, but also that
Blevins did in fact do so, the defendant stood in the shoes of Blevins with
respect to so much of the indictment as alleged that the witness swore falsely;
and, since the defendant in New Jersey may have pre-trial inspection of his
confession if he needs it to prepare for trial unless the state shows such disclosure would hamper the prosecution, 00 that the defendant was entitled to
an inspection of the testimony given by Blevins before the grand jury. From
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

36 N.J. 219, 176 A.2d 1 (1961).
Brief for Appellant, pp. la-3a, State v. Moffa, supra note 100.
Id. pp. 3a-5a.
Id. p. 6a.
State v. Moffa, 64 N.J. Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (Law Div. 1960).
State v. Moffa, supra note 100, at 232, 176 A.2d at 4.
State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
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the cases in the federal courts which hold that one charged with perjury before the grand jury is entitled to pre-trial inspection of his testimony, 10 7 the
majority reasoned that the need of the alleged suborner is still more evident,
since he was not present when the offense was allegedly committed, and could
hardly know what factual or legal issues an inspection might reveal until he
has obtained it. Further, the court said, a defendant cannot be confined to so
much of the scene as the state believes to be relevant, and if there is no outweighing cause, he should have the view before the trial, the better to prepare
for that event.' 08 As to the state's argument that the secrecy of the grand jury
must be preserved, 10 9 the majority held that if this policy barred disclosure
before trial, it would bar it as well at the trial itself, that nothing suggests the
invasion would be less at one time than at the other, and that the question is
whether the policy in favor of secrecy outweighs the demand that guilt be
adjudged upon the whole truth. The court further noted that if a policy issue
were involved, it was resolved when the prosecution was started, and that the
state thereby lifted the veil so that it might not limit the trial to a glimpse of
what happened-that everything relevant must be revealed." 0 The court also
held that inspection of the testimony is a matter of discretion with the trial
judge.
As for the fear expressed that to reveal all the testimony of the witness
before the grand jury would enable a defendant to "tamper" with him and
that the policy of secrecy was designed to guard against that possibility, the
majority held that that could not bar the right to see the testimony, since the
possibility of tampering would be the same whether the witness made his
statement before a grand jury or elsewhere. The court reasoned that if
"tamper" means "intimidate" or worse, the answer is that the witness'
identity had already been revealed; or, if "tamper" means that defendant
might induce the witness to change the portion of his testimony charged in
the indictment to be false, that much of his testimony had already been disclosed in the indictment. Finally, the court said that if "tamper" were meant
to imply that the witness might be persuaded falsely to explain away something in the balance of his testimony, that possibility was too conjectural to
outweigh the need for a fair opportunity to investigate whether the criminal
event did occur in fact and in law."'

Two justices dissented in the Moffa case. 112 Justice Proctor argued that
107.
ton, 191
1952).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954) ; United States v. RemingF.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951) ; United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J.
State v. Moffa, supra note 100, at 222, 176 A.2d at 2.
See N.J. RULES 3:3-7.
State v. Moffa, supra note 100, at 222-23, 176 A.2d at 3.
Id. at 224, 176 A.2d at 4.
Id. at 225, 228, 176 A.2d at 4, 6.
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the case came under reason (3) of the Rose case,113 i.e., that secrecy must be
maintained to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness,
and advocated that inspection of grand jury testimony be made only at the
trial for the purpose of impeaching the witness, with an adjournment of the
trial to allow defense counsel time to examine the testimony. Justice Hall,
however, was of the opinion that the concept of the majority would automatically result in a great expansion of criminal pre-trial discovery and that
further enlargement was fraught with the possibility of grave damage to the
public interest in too many cases and not necessary for fair treatment of the
criminal defendant in most situations. He was also fearful that permitting a
defendant to examine the testimony on the grounds advanced by the defendant, i.e., in order "to prepare his defense" and "to provide defendant an
equal opportunity for a full and fair presentation of the available evidence
which is now unilaterally available to the State," would open the door to pretrial discovery of all grand jury testimony, and that this did not differ in substance from the inspection of statements given by witnesses to the prosecutor.
The justice further saw the effect of the decision as placing the burden upon
the prosecutor to show that defendant had not demonstrated a "particularized
need" for the pre-trial inspection, since the accused could almost invariably
show that some factual or legal defense might be developed from the testimony
given, that the decision seemed to foreshadow a trend in that direction, and
14
that this would remove the matter from the discretion of the trial judge.'
It is apparent from the dissenting opinions that State v. Moffa projects
a more liberal trend in criminal discovery proceedings not only in New Jersey,
but elsewhere in the states.
COMPARISON WITH THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY

Since the adoption of the Indictable Offenses Act in 1848115 the accused
in England has had access to all the testimony of the witnesses against him.
Grand juries have been abolished in England, and bills of indictment charging
an indictable offense may be preferred by any person before the proper
court. 116 The testimony against the accused is presented before the committing
magistrate," 7 and depositions of these witnesses are made available to the
prisoner.
113. United States v. Rose, supra note 107.
114. State v. Moffa, supra note 100, at 229-30, 176 A.2d at 6-7.
115. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, § 1, 27, discussed note 3 supra.
116. The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1, discussed note 4 supra.
117. The procedure before the committing magistrate is governed by the Indictable
Offenses Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42; the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16
Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55; the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, and related statutes, as well as by the MAGISTRATES' COURTS RULES, 1952.
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A defendant charged with an indictable offense is brought before the
magistrate by summons or warrant based on an information.1 1 8 The court
then holds an examination, the object of which is not to determine the guilt or
1 20
innocence of the accused, 119 but whether he should be committed for trial.
Evidence of the prosecuting witnesses before the examining magistrate must
be given in the presence of the accused, who may cross-examine the witnesses. r '2 The prosecutor or person making the charge must appear in person
or by attorney. The police or a private prosecutor may proceed with the
prosecution, except where the Director of Public Prosecutions takes over the
proceedings.1 22 The accused has the right to counsel or a solicitor at the pre123
liminary hearing.
The proceedings before the examining magistrate are opened by calling
the accused and reading the charges against him. He is not asked to plead,
but the case of the prosecution is commenced at once. No objection can be
taken to any formal defect in the information or process unless it has misled
the defendant; if this is shown, the court on application of the defendant must
adjourn the hearing; however, the objection is waived if not taken before the
evidence is given. 1 24 If the examining magistrate permits it, the prosecutor's
counsel or solicitor may make an opening speech outlining his case. The evidence is then adduced on oath or affirmation. The attendance of witnesses and
production of documents may be secured by summons or warrant issued by
25

the magistrates.1

As soon as the evidence for the prosecution has been given, the court,
unless it decides not to commit the accused for trial, must explain the charge
in ordinary language and caution the prisoner that anything he says may be
given in evidence against him at the trial, and must then ask the defendant
if he wishes to say anything in answer to the charge. Any statement made by
the accused in answer to the charge is put in writing, read to him and signed
by one of the examining justices and by the accused if. he consents. Such
statement may be used as evidence against the defendant at his trial. 26 At
the preliminary hearing the accused must be given an opportunity to testify
in his own behalf and to call witnesses, and his attorney must be heard on
his behalf, either before or after the evidence for the defense is taken. Counsel
118. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 1(1).
119. Regina v. Carden, 5 Q.B.D. 1, 6 (1879).
120. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55 § 2(3).
121. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 4(3).
122. 10 HALSBURY L. ENG. § 657 n. (1) (3d ed. 1955).
123. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 99.
124. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 100; Regina
v. Hughes, 4 Q.B.D. 614, 628, 633 (1879).
125. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 77(1) ; 10
HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, §§ 658-59.
126. MAGISTRATES' COURTS RULES, 1952, S.I. 1952 No. 2190, r. 5 (3), (4).
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or the solicitor for the prosecution is then entitled to be heard in reply. The
examining magistrates rule on questions of evidence. If the accused does not
present his witnesses at the preliminary hearing, but offers them for the first
127
time at trial, this creates considerable suspicion, in absence of an explanation.
The examining magistrates cause the testimony of each witness, except
character witnesses, and including the testimony of the accused, to be reduced to writing in the form of depositions, to be read in the presence of
the accused, and to be signed by the witnesses. All witnesses are then bound
over to the trial unless their attendance is unnecessary or their evidence is
merely formal, in which case they may be bound over conditionally, i.e., on
notice being given to them to appear as witnesses at the trial. One of the
examining magistrates must sign the depositions which are required to contain all evidence material to the case, including any statement by the accused.1 28 Depositions of a person too ill to appear may be taken at the residence of the witness, on notice, with opportunity to cross-examine, which
depositions may be used as evidence at the trial, if signed by the justice before
made the statewhom taken and if the court is satisfied that the witness who
129
court.
in
evidence
give
or
travel
to
unable
or
ment is dead
When the accused is committed for trial, a bill of indictment is preferred
and signed by the proper officer,13 0 and the person having custody of the
depositions on which he has been committed must, as soon as practicable after
application is made to him by or on behalf of the accused, and after payment
of a fee, supply to the accused copies of the depositions and of the information
if it is in writing. 13 1 The magistrates' court which committed the defendant
made
for trial must then send to the trial court the depositions, all statements
32
exhibits.'
of
list
a
and
court,
by the accused before the magistrates'
When the indictment is preferred and signed by the proper officer of the
court, the names of all the witnesses who testified and deposed before the
33
Decommitting magistrate are endorsed on the back of the indictment.
34
He is then arraigned, pleads
fendant receives a copy of the indictment.'
127. 10 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, §§ 662-63.
128. Id. §§ 660, 669; Indictable Offenses Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, § 17;
Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, §§ 12-13.
129. 10 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, §§ 686, 768; Criminal Justice Act, 1925,
15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, § 13; Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2,
c. 55, § 41; The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, § 6; see The
King v. Bros., Ex parte Hardy, [1911] 1 K.B. 159 (1910).
130. The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5, c. 36, § 2; ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE 64 (33d ed.
1954).

131. MAGISTRATES' COURTS RULES, 1952, S.I. 1952 No. 2190, r. 13.
132. 10 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, § 670.

133. Id. § 764.
134. INDICTMENTS
at 67.

RULES,

1915, r. 13(1), (3) ;

ARCHBOLD,

op. cit. supra note 130,
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to the indictment, and is tried before the court to which he has been committed.
At the trial the prosecutor calls the witnesses whose names are on the
back of the indictment. Counsel for the defendant may then cross-examine
the witnesses, followed by re-examination by counsel for the prosecution.
The court rules on evidence and is not bound by the rulings of the magistrates'
court .13

The prosecution may call witnesses who were not examined before

the committing justices and whose names are not on the back of the indictment, but notice of intention to call such witnesses should be given the defendant, and copies of their proofs should be supplied to the defendant and
to the court. Failure to give such notice and copies does not render the
additional evidence inadmissible, but is ground for postponement of the trial.
When the prosecutor decides not to call a witness from whom he has taken
a statement, he must make the witness available to the defense, but need not
36
supply the defendant with a copy of the statement.'
Depositions of a witness taken before the examining magistrate may be
read into evidence without further proof where the deposition is of an unnecessary witness or of a witness who is dead, insane, too ill to travel, or
prevented from appearing by the accused or by another on his behalf. It
must be established at trial, however, that the depositions were signed by
the justice before whom taken, and that they were taken in the presence of
the accused with full opportunity for cross-examination. Such depositions
are admissible whether the accused is tried for the offense for which he has
been committed or for any offense arising out of the same transaction or set
of circumstances.'

3 7

It is apparent from all this that the problem of the right to examine
testimony of witnesses before the grand jury cannot arise in England. While
the law there is to the effect that, except in a few cases,' 38 neither party in
a criminal case can obtain evidence from the opposite side by means of interrogatories or discovery, there is little necessity for such discovery, since
the prosecution's entire case is disclosed at the preliminary hearing. Documents or articles introduced in evidence at the preliminary hearing become
known to defense counsel so that the discovery methods resorted to in this
country would be of little use.
135. 10 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, § 663.
136. Id. §§ 761-62, 764-65; ARCHBOLD, op. cit. supra note 130, at 188-197.
137. 10 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, § 766; see also 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1850 (3d ed. 1940) ; Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, § 13.
138. E.g., under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 11, §§ 7,
10, the prosecution may examine the bank records of the defendant on order of the court.
On occasions, the court has made an order permitting inspection of letters seized under
a search warrant and in the hands of the prosecution. The prosecutor may also serve a
notice to produce upon defendant to lay a foundation for secondary evidence. See 10
HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 122, §§ 837, 839 n. (e) ; WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 137,
§ 1850 at 395.
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SUMMARY OF DISCOVERY METHODS IN

CRIMINAL CASES

Thus far, we have considered the right of the defendant to a pre-trial
examination of the grand jury testimony of witnesses for the state. In those
jurisdictions where the information has replaced the indictment, this right
is not so important or so feasible as in those jurisdictions requiring indictment by grand jury. In some jurisdictions the right is assured by statute 3 9
in all cases. In others, the statutes give the right to inspection in perjury
indictments or on an application to dismiss the indictment. 14 0 Elsewhere the
right exists for impeachment purposes at the trial, 14 ' and, by recent decisions
in other states, in advance of trial for purposes of impeachment and preparation of the defense.

142

This, however, does not reach the other areas of discovery available to
a defendant in a criminal case. In preparing his defense, counsel for the
defendant has a number of well-defined areas which he can explore in addition to the motion for inspection of grand jury testimony. 43 These include
pre-trial examination of (1) "tangible" or physical evidence, such as the
murder weapon and fatal bullet,' 44 an object allegedly bearing defendant's
fingerprints, 1 45 and recordings of defendant's conversation with a police officer posing as an accomplice ;146 (2) documents or records such as autopsy
reports, 147 FBI reports, 14 8 reformatory and penitentiary records, 149 photo-

graphs, 150 engineers reports' 51 and records of a former prosecutor charged
with non-feasance in office ;1.12 (3) confessions of the defendant ;153 and, (4) in
139. See text accompanying and authorities cited notes 37-43 supra.
140. See text accompanying and authorities cited notes 44-48 supra.
141. See text accompanying and authorities cited notes 69-76 supra.
142. See text accompanying and authorities cited notes 77-114 supra.
143. See generally Notes, 53 DIcK. L. REV. 301 (1949), 6 UTAH L. REV. 531 (1959).
144. State v. Bunk, 63 A.2d 842 (Essex County Ct., N.J. 1949); Di Joseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958).
145. United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (3d Div. Anchorage 1922).
146. Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959) ; see Vance v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P.2d 773 (1958).
147. Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957); People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. County Ct.
1960) ; State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
148. State v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1957) ; State v. Thompson, supra note 147.
149. State v. Bunk, supra note 144.
150. Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
151. Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1960).
152. State v. Winne, 27 N.J. Super. 304, 99 A.2d 368 (App. Div. 1953).
153. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945) ; State v. Haas, 188 Md.
63, 51 A.2d 647 (1947) ; People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959) ; State
v. Johnson, supra note 106. The trial court has discretionary power to grant defendant's
motion for inspection of a confession. Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312
P.2d 698 (1957) ; People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956) ; People v. D'Andrea,
20 Misc. 2d 1070, 195 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Kings County Ct. 1960) ; State v. Leland, 190 Ore.
598, 227 P.2d 785 (1951).
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a few states, statements of witnesses for the prosecution given to the district
attorney. 15 4 But some jurisdictions follow the common law strictly and will
not permit a defendant to have pre-trial discovery of evidence in the hands
of the prosecutor. 155 An increasing number of other states permit such inspection in the discretion of the trial court.156 Most jurisdictions will allow
an inspection of "tangible" or physical evidence. Few will allow an examination of statements of witnesses to the prosecutor in advance of trial, although
many follow the Jencks rule and permit the use of such statements at the trial
157
for impeachment purposes.
Only California allows liberal discovery in all areas, within the discretion of the court. 158 It can be said that under the liberal procedure afforded
in California, a defendant may have as complete a disclosure of the state's
case as any party may have in a civil proceeding, provided the defendant in
the criminal case satisfies the court that he has good cause and that the ends
of justice require it. This is in keeping with the liberal proceedings of our
courts, and the modern concept of the administration of criminal justice.
CONCLUSION

There is a definite trend toward a more liberal procedure on the criminal
side of our courts. We have come a long way since the defendant was denied
the right to counsel and the judge acted as his advocate, but, while the right
to discovery in civil cases has been extended considerably, the right to discovery in criminal cases has not been so readily accepted.
A number of reasons have been advanced for denying the right to the
same discovery in criminal cases. It is said that the defendant is likely to
commit perjury. This fear was expressed when full discovery was first
proposed in civil cases. Experience has not borne out that fear. Another
reason urged against pre-trial discovery in criminal cases is that defendant
154. Notes, 6 UTAH L. REV. 531 (1959), 21 MONT. L. REV. 189 (1960). In California, the granting of permission rests within the discretion of the court upon good cause
shown. Cash v. Superior Court, supra note 146; Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423,
340 P.2d 593 (1959) ; Vance v. Superior Court, supra note 146. Such inspection is granted
only with respect to matters within such statements relating to the witness' testimony at
the preliminary hearing. Funk v. Superior Court, supra; People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d
713, 355 P.2d 641 (1960) (dictum). A blanket request that the prosecutor turn over to
the defendant all such statements will be denied. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349
P.2d 964 (1960). New Jersey, one of the more liberal discovery states, has refused to
permit pre-trial examination by the defendant of witnesses' statements given to the
prosecutor, until more experience has been had with the practical operation of the decision
of State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958), where a detective who took a statement from the accused was required to produce it at trial. State v. Johnson, supra note
106.
155. See generally Notes, supra note 143.
156. Ibid.
157. See, e.g., People v. Wolff, 19 Ill. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960) ; State v.
Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
158. People v. Estrada, supra note 154.
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might "tamper" with or intimidate the witnesses. To this it is reasoned that
the court should not bar a pre-trial investigation of the criminal event itself
because of a speculative fear that the fact-finding process will be overwhelmed
by criminal activity. Moreover, the statement or the fact is already a matter
of record which no amount of "tampering" can change. Finally, it is stated
that there is inequality in that the state may not have pre-trial discovery of
a defendant. In respect of this it should be noted that the state is better
equipped to prepare its case than is the defendant. The prosecutor's office has
its representatives immediately upon the scene of the crime. The defendant
is seldom in a position to have investigators at that stage, and an innocent
and impecunious defendant, who has assigned counsel, gets virtually no
opportunity to develop the facts first hand. 159
What must eventually happen to afford a defendant equal opportunity
with the state is a development of our preliminary hearing along the lines
of the English procedure, where all the evidence by the prosecution is presented before the committing magistrates, and a copy of the depositions is
furnished the defendant. The interests of the state would be amply protected
under this procedure since the depositions could be used at the trial in the
event the witness became unavailable. Since the truth is best revealed by a
decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial, no harm can come to the
state from a full disclosure of the facts. If the evidence is overwhelmingly
against the defendant, his counsel would be in a position to advise a plea of
guilty or "no contest," which would result in a considerable saving of the
courts' time and the public revenue. If the discovery disclosed that the
state had a weak case or no case at all, the prosecutor might very well move
to dismiss the proceedings.
There may be instances where complete discovery would not be in the
best interests of the government. It may be that confidential sources of information or matters of state should not be disclosed. However, these instances would not be common, and the court's discretion would be ample
safeguard against an unwarranted disclosure. In the greater number of cases,
a fuller pre-trial discovery of grand jury testimony, as well as of other evidence
in the hands of the prosecutor, might well ensure a more impartial administration of criminal justice.
159. See, e.g., State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219, 176 A.2d 1 (1961) ; State v. Johnson,
supra note 157.

